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1. Introduction
The gains from trade have always been central to international economics. With the ad-
vent of product differentiation (Krugman, 1980) and heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003),
quantifying these gains has become both more important and more challenging. More
important, because they stem from changes in productivity and the number of varieties
consumed. More challenging, because endogenous product diversity raises conceptual
issues that have to be dealt with (Feenstra, 1994; Broda and Weinstein, 2006).
Despite these new channels for gains from trade, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-
Clare (2012; henceforth, acr) have shown in an influential paper that – conditional on
the trade elasticity and the import share of a country – many trade models deliver the
same simple formula for gains from trade: d lnWj = (1/")d lnjj , where Wj stands for
a measure of welfare in country j, " < 0 is the trade elasticity, and jj is the share of
domestic expenditure. This result has stirred a debate on whether ‘new models’ have
‘old gains’, or whether they do indeed deliver ‘new gains’. acr’s simple sufficient statistics
for gains from trade are derived under three macro restrictions: (r1) trade in goods is
balanced; (r2) aggregate profits are a constant share of gdp; and (r3) the import demand
system is ces.1 Those restrictions are satisfied in various trade models like Armington
(1969) and Krugman (1980). They are also satisfied in the heterogeneous firms model by
Melitz (2003) when productivity distributions are untruncated Pareto. As recently shown
by Melitz and Redding (2014a), however, the acr result is sensitive to small changes in the
specification on the technology side of the economy. For example, when the untruncated
Pareto distributions are replaced with truncated ones, the acr result does not apply to the
Melitz (2003) model: the trade elasticity and the domestic expenditure share are no longer
sufficient statistics for measuring welfare changes, and firm heterogeneity provides a new
channel for gains from trade.
In this paper, we show that the results of acr and of Melitz and Redding (2014a)
are both sensitive to small changes on the preference side. More precisely, we generalize
their formulae for welfare changes to allow for various cardinalizations of the subutility
functions for varieties. Despite the same macro restrictions and the same equilibrium allocations,
our new formula coincides with the original ones if and only if the number of varieties
is invariant to foreign shocks. When product diversity varies, different cardinalizations
generate different welfare changes for any given change in the trade equilibrium.
1As pointed out by acr, ces preferences are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for (r3).
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The intuition underlying this seemingly surprising result is that the change in the
equilibrium allocation is preserved under different cardinalizations of the subutility func-
tions, whereas the welfare change generally depends on the chosen cardinalization when
product diversity is endogenous.2 An affine transformation of the subutility functions
does not affect the first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem. Yet, it does
affect the relative importance of product diversity and quantity in assessing how much
income a consumer needs to be compensated with to keep her utility fixed at the initial
level before foreign shocks.
Our result reveals a fundamental difficulty in quantifying welfare gains implied by
new trade models, where the number of varieties consumed responds to foreign shocks.
While only aggregate data is needed in the acr formula, Melitz and Redding (2014a)
require firm-level data to cope with truncated productivity distributions. We show that
even with such data, one cannot solve the cardinalization issue. Indeed, small changes on
the technology side do affect the equilibrium allocation (and are therefore identifiable from
the data), whereas the cardinalizations on the preference side do not affect the equilibrium
allocation (and are therefore hardly identifiable from the data).3 Thus, there is no simple
one-to-one mapping from a change in the equilibrium allocation to a change in welfare,
even when using widely accepted welfare measures that are insensitive to a monotonic
transformation of the upper-tier utility function. Accordingly, without knowing the ‘true’
cardinalization, any assessment of the gains from trade seems arbitrary and, therefore,
debatable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
model and derive our key result, namely the generalized acr formula. In Section 3, we
apply that formula to Armington (1969), Krugman (1980), Melitz (2003), and Melitz and
Redding (2014a). Finally, in Section 4 we summarize our key findings and discuss their
empirical implications.
2We show that the simplest Armington (1969) case analyzed by acr is not affected by the cardinalization
because each country produces a variety of a differentiated good, so that the number of varieties is fixed.
Hence, it is endogenous changes in product diversity that lie at the heart of the problem.
3This problem does not arise in the estimation of production functions, where the cardinalization can be
estimated as the tfp terms. However, it is unclear what to estimate in a utility context because the utility
level is not observable.
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2. Model
We present a slightly modified subutility function that satisfies the same macro restric-
tions and generates the same equilibrium allocation than in acr and Melitz and Redding
(2014a). Following Behrens, Kanemoto, and Murata (2014), assume that the utility of a
consumer in country j is given by
Uj = F
0@" Iå
i=1
Z

ij
u

qij(!)
( 1)/

d!
#/( 1)1A (1)
with
u

qij(!)
( 1)/

=
(
aij(!)( 1)/ + bjqij(!)( 1)/ for qij(!) > 0
0 for qij(!) = 0
,
where F is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function; where I is the number of
countries; where u is a subutility function; where qij(!) denotes the quantity of variety
! produced in country i and consumed in country j; and where aij(!)  0, bj > 0, and
 > 1 are fixed utility parameters. We denote by nij  j
ij j the (generally endogenously
determined) mass of varieties produced in i and consumed in j. Observe that: (i) the
affine transformation of the ces function qij(!)/( 1) via aij(!)( 1)/ and bj is the only
transformation that does not affect the equilibrium allocation (see Appendix A for the
proof); and (ii) when aij(!) = 0 and bj = 1 for all i, j, and ! (which corresponds to
a particular cardinalization of the subutility functions), and when F (x) = x, we obtain
exactly the specification in acr.
In what follows, we assume that aij(!) > 0 and bj > 0 for all i, j, and !. Let
Aj 
"
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
aij(!)
( 1)/d!
#/( 1)
and Qj 
"
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
qij(!)
( 1)/d!
#/( 1)
. (2)
Note that although aij(!) is exogenous, Aj can vary since the mass nij of varieties is
generally endogenous. The utility function can then be expressed as follows:
Uj = F
h
A
( 1)/
j + bjQ
( 1)/
j
i/( 1)
. (3)
There are two different ways to obtain our main result. We first consider expenditure
minimization and then deal with utility maximization. The expenditure minimization
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problem is given by
min
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)qij(!)d!
s.t. F
h
A
( 1)/
j + bjQ
( 1)/
j
i/( 1)  U j .
From this, we obtain the expenditure function conditional on Aj (see Appendix B):
e(Aj ,Pj ,U j) = Pj
8<:

F 1(U j)
( 1)/  A( 1)/j
bj
9=;
/( 1)
, (4)
where
Pj 
"
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)
1 d!
#1/(1 )
(5)
is a price aggregate. In the initial equilibrium before foreign shocks, e(Aj ,Pj ,U j) = wj
holds by definition of the expenditure function, where wj is the wage rate in country j.
Following acr and Melitz and Redding (2014a), we assume that wj  1 is the numeraire
and invariant to foreign shocks.
We now define the equivalent income that keeps consumers at their initial utility level
as Ej  wj/e(Aj ,Pj ,U j).4 Several remarks are in order. First, since wj  1, the
equivalent income Ej may be viewed as the inverse of the expenditure function. Sec-
ond, since e(Aj ,Pj ,U j) = wj in the initial equilibrium, Ej = 1 holds before foreign
shocks. Third, an increase in Ej , or equivalently a decrease in e(Aj ,Pj ,U j), after foreign
shocks translates into welfare gains. Last, for welfare gains to be associated with a
positive sign, we consider in what follows the rate of change in the equivalent income,
d lnEj =  d ln e(Aj ,Pj ,U j).
Let Wj  1/Pj denote the inverse of the price aggregate, which is used as a welfare
measure by acr and Melitz and Redding (2014a). Then, equation (4) can be rewritten as
Ej = Wj
8<:

F 1(U j)
( 1)/  A( 1)/j
bj
9=;
 /( 1)
. (6)
4See Mrázová and Neary (2014a, b) for an equivalent definition using the indirect utility function. The
equivalent income can be viewed as a version of the Allais surplus, which is defined as the surplus of the
numeraire good that is generated while keeping the utility level constant. As is well known, for a marginal
change, the Marshallian consumer surplus, the compensating variation, the equivalent variation, and the
Allais surplus all coincide.
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Taking the rate of change while holding U j constant at the initial level, we have
d lnEj =
A
( 1)/
j
F 1(U j)
( 1)/  A( 1)/j d lnAj + d lnWj . (7)
Let
Aj 
A
( 1)/
j
A
( 1)/
j + bjQ
( 1)/
j
and Qj 
bjQ
( 1)/
j
A
( 1)/
j + bjQ
( 1)/
j
(8)
be share variables such that Aj + Qj = 1. Evaluating (3) at the initial utility level U j and
plugging the resulting expression into (7), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition (Equivalent income change due to foreign shocks) Holding utility constant
before and after foreign shocks requires the following rate of change in the equivalent income:
d lnEj =
Aj
Qj
d lnAj + d lnWj . (9)
In the special case where Aj is invariant to foreign shocks, i.e., d lnAj = 0, the rate of change in
the equivalent income boils down to the rate of change in the real wage in Arkolakis et al. (2012)
or Melitz and Redding (2014a), i.e., d lnEj = d lnWj .
A few remarks are in order. First, we can obtain the same formula from utility maximiza-
tion instead of expenditure minimization (see Appendix C). Second, the rate of change
in the equivalent income d lnEj =  d ln e(Aj ,Pj ,U j) need not be the same as the rate
of change in the real wage d lnWj . Intuitively, when foreign shocks expand product
diversity, domestic consumers spend less to achieve their initial utility level. This gain is
captured only partially by the rate of change in Pj when d lnAj 6= 0. Hence, omitting
the first term of the right-hand side in (9) leads to an incorrect assessment of the true
welfare change. Last, the new formula is invariant to a monotonic transformation F of
the upper-tier utility function but can vary with different cardinalizations of subutility
functions. We explore this implication using workhorse trade models in what follows.
3. Examples
Unlike acr and Melitz and Redding (2014a), how welfare changes with foreign shocks
under our preference structure crucially depends on how Aj changes with those shocks.
As can be seen from (2), only changes in the sets 
ij of varieties consumed can affect Aj .
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Thus, the way product diversity in country j changes due to foreign shocks is crucial for
assessing the equivalent income change d lnEj in (9). We now discuss this point with
reference to the existing literature.
3.1 Armington (1969)
Consider first the basic Armington (1969) model, where each country produces a single
variety of a differentiated good, i.e., the sets 
ij of varieties are degenerated. We assume
that trade costs are finite: ij < ¥ for all i and j. We then obtain the Armington
specification from the one in Section 2 by letting qij(!) = qij and nij = 1 for all i, j,
and !. In this case, Aj is invariant to foreign shocks, so that d lnAj = 0. Thus, the
equivalent income change (9) becomes d lnEj = d lnWj , where the latter expression is
obtained by acr as follows:
d lnWj =
1
1  d lnjj . (10)
Hence, the change in the share of domestic expenditure, jj , and the trade elasticity
1/(1  ) are sufficient statistics for assessing welfare changes.
3.2 Krugman (1980)
We now turn to the case of monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms as in
Krugman (1980). In this case, d lnAj in (9) need not be zero because Aj , as given by
(2), is endogenous and depends on the mass nij of varieties imported from i to j. For
simplicity, assume that aij(!) = aij > 0 for all ! 2 
ij . Taking the log of A( 1)/ in (2)
and differentiating, we have
d lnAj =

  1
I
å
i=1
ijd lnnij , (11)
where ij  (aij/Aj)( 1)/nij are share variables with åIi=1 ij = 1. Since d lnAj can be
different from zero, the acr formula need not hold even with the same macro restrictions
and the same equilibrium allocations as in acr.
We need to distinguish two cases in Krugman (1980), depending on the sources of
foreign shocks. First, with finite trade costs, the mass nij of varieties imported from i
to j does not change with shocks to trade costs ij . Hence, even with aij > 0, we have
d lnAj = 0, so that the acr formula (10) holds. Second, shocks to either population
or to fixed costs of production change the mass nij of varieties and thus affect welfare
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depending on the chosen cardinalization aij . Specifically, nij increases with population
and decreases with fixed costs in country i. Accordingly, when aij > 0, positive (resp.,
negative) shocks to population, or negative (resp., positive) shocks to fixed costs, lead
to d lnAj > 0 (resp., d lnAj < 0) and, therefore, the acr formula underestimates (resp.,
overestimates) the welfare changes from the foreign shocks.
Hence, in Krugman (1980) with aij > 0, the acr formula: (i) holds exactly for changes
in finite trade costs; (ii) provides a lower bound for possible equivalent income changes
when there are positive shocks to population or negative shocks to fixed costs; and (iii)
provides an upper bound for possible equivalent income changes when there are negative
shocks to population or positive shocks to fixed costs.
One may argue that setting aij = a > 0 for all i and j yields ij = nij/åIi=1 nij , in
which case d lnAj is independent of the cardinalization parameter a. However, there is
no a priori reason to believe that this is the ‘right’ cardinalization. More importantly, even
with aij = a > 0 for all i and j, the existing formula provides only either an upper bound
or a lower bound for all possible equivalent income changes when product diversity
responds to foreign shocks. Note that even with aij = a > 0 for all i and j, the share
variables Aj and Qj in our formula (9) depend on a.
3.3 Melitz (2003)
We finally consider the case of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms as
in Melitz (2003). We first analyze the case with an untruncated Pareto productivity
distribution as in acr. We then turn to the case of a truncated Pareto productivity
distribution as in Melitz and Redding (2014a). Last, we briefly discuss the case with
an arbitrary productivity distribution.
Untruncated Pareto distribution. Assuming that Aj = 0, and that the productivity dis-
tribution is untruncated Pareto with shape parameter k > 1, acr show that the same
formula as in Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980) applies to the Melitz (2003) model:
d lnWj =  1
k
d lnjj , (12)
which shows that the trade elasticity,  k, and the change in the share of domestic
expenditure, jj , are sufficient statistics for measuring welfare changes in the wake of
foreign shocks.
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Contrary to acr, we consider the case where Aj > 0. As in the previous subsection,
we assume that aij(!) = aij > 0 for all ! 2 
ij , so that equation (11) still holds. Then,
foreign shocks generally affect Aj via the mass nij of varieties exported from country i to
country j. Consider the productivity distribution G and its density g. Recall that in the
Melitz (2003) model, the mass of firms selling from i to j is given by
nij = Mei[1 G('xij)], (13)
where Mei is the mass of entrants in country i, where 1  G('xij) is the share of firms
selling from i to j, and where 'xij is the productivity cutoff for exporting from i to j. Let
h('xij)  g('xij)/[1 G('xij)] denote the hazard function. Since (11) holds, it follows that
  1

d lnAj =
I
å
i=1
ij

d lnMei   h('xij)'xijd ln'xij

=
I
å
i 6=j
ij

d lnMei   h('xij)'xijd ln'xij

(14)
+jj

d lnMej   h('xjj)'xjjd ln'xjj

.
As shown by Melitz and Redding (2014b), in the Melitz (2003) model with a Pareto
productivity distribution, the mass of entrants in country i increases with a positive shock
to labor supply Li (or, equivalently, a negative shock to the sunk costs of entry Fei), and
it is independent of trade costs: dMei/dLi > 0; dMei/dFei < 0; and dMei/dij = 0.
Hence, under a shock to trade costs, equation (14) reduces to
  1

d lnAj =  
"
I
å
i 6=j
ijh('
x
ij)'
x
ijd ln'
x
ij + jjh('
x
jj)'
x
jjd ln'
x
jj
#
(15)
=  k
"
I
å
i 6=j
ijd ln'xij + jjd ln'
x
jj
#
,
where the latter equality comes from the untruncated Pareto assumption. The sign of
d lnAj crucially depends on how the productivity cutoffs change in the wake of the trade
cost shock. To our knowledge, however, there is no analytical proof for the asymmetric
multi-country version of the Melitz (2003) model of how the export and domestic cutoffs,
'xij and '
x
jj , change with trade costs, especially when wages are endogenous.
5 Similarly,
5The only exception is Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2013, Proof of Proposition 1), who show that
in a two-country version of the Melitz model a fall in ij decreases the export cutoff 'xij , yet increases the
domestic cutoff 'xjj (we thank Marc Melitz for bringing this reference to our attention). Thus, the sign of
(15) is ambiguous and it is unclear whether the acr formula over- or underestimates the welfare changes
due to the trade cost shock even in the two-country case.
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not much can be said about how shocks to population or to sunk costs of entry affect
d lnAj . Hence, even in the basic version of the Melitz model with an untruncated Pareto
productivity distribution, we can hardly assess welfare changes due to the presence of
the d lnAj term in (9). In a nutshell, a small modification on the preference side that
satisfies the same macro restrictions and leaves the equilibrium allocations unchanged
affects significantly the amount of information needed to measure welfare changes.
Truncated Pareto distribution. As argued by Melitz and Redding (2014a), the acr result
with heterogeneous firms crucially hinges on the assumption of an untruncated Pareto
distribution with shape parameter k and lower bound 'min for firm productivities. If
the underlying distribution is, for example, truncated at 'max < ¥, the trade elasticity
depends on the productivity cutoff and is specific to each country. In that case, there are
no simple sufficient statistics for the welfare gains from trade liberalization.
Assuming that Aj = 0, Melitz and Redding (2014a, eq.(107) in the online Appendix)
show that with a truncated Pareto distribution the acr formula is modified as follows:
d lnWj =
1
#jj
(d lnMej   d lnjj) . (16)
where #jj =    1+ ('xjj) is the domestic partial trade elasticity, and where ('xjj) =
 d ln ('xjj)/d ln'xjj is the elasticity of ('xjj) =
R 'max
'xjj
' 1dG('). Note that if the Pareto
distribution for productivity has no upper bound, it follows that ('xjj) = k   (   1).
Since d lnMej = 0 in the wake of a shock to trade costs, the acr formula (12) obtains.
Our formula for equivalent income changes encompasses the case analyzed by Melitz
and Redding (2014a). Indeed, plugging (16) into (9), we can generalize their formula as
follows:
d lnEj =
Aj
Qj
d lnAj +
1
  1+ ('xjj)
(d lnMej   d lnjj) . (17)
Note that (14) applies to both the untruncated and truncated Pareto versions of the model,
and so does (17). In other words, in the general case the welfare changes are sensitive
to modeling choices on both the technology side (truncation of the distributions) and the
preference side (cardinalization parameters).
General distribution. Melitz (2003) does not impose a particular distribution for produc-
tivity draws. In general, no clear predictions can be made on whether the masses of
firms and the cutoffs increase or decrease with foreign shocks. Furthermore, as shown by
(14), the impact of a shock on Aj depends on a complex weighting scheme involving the
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cardinalization parameters. Consequently, without prior knowledge of the aij terms,
nothing can be said on how foreign shocks affect Aj , except that d lnAj is not zero
generically.
4. Summary and conclusions
As shown by Melitz and Redding (2014a), the formula for welfare changes due to trade
shocks put forth by acr is sensitive to small changes on the technology side of the
models. The extended acr formula derived by Melitz and Redding (2014a) suggests
that additional moments from firm-level data can be used to quantify the welfare gains.
Our analysis, however, shows that things are not that simple. When product diversity
responds to foreign shocks, welfare changes can be arbitrary. The reasons are that for
any given change in the trade equilibrium there exists a continuum of welfare changes
reflecting different cardinalizations of the subutility functions for varieties, and that the
‘true’ cardinalization is hardly identifiable. The gains from trade implied by new trade
models are thus elusive.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Affine transformation.
To establish claim (i), consider the general problem where the subutility function u is
replaced by f  u, where f is an arbitrary increasing and concave function. Then, taking
the ratio of the first-order conditions for the consumer problem with respect to varieties
! and !0, sourced from countries i and k, respectively, yields
qij(!)
qkj(!0)
 1/ f 0(u(qij(!)))
f 0(u(qkj(!0)))
=
pij(!)
pkj(!0)
.
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The solution to this equation is generically identical to that in the untransformed case, the
first-order conditions of which are given by
qij(!)
qkj(!0)
 1/
=
pij(!)
pkj(!0)
,
if and only if f 0(u(qij(!))) = f 0(u(qkj(!0))) for all varieties ! 2 
ij and !0 2 
kj and
for all quantities qij(!)  0 and qkj(!0)  0. This is possible if and only if f 0 is constant,
which directly implies that f must be an affine function.
Appendix B: Expenditure function.
To obtain the expenditure function, we solve the expenditure minimization problem:
min
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)qij(!)d!
s.t. F
0@( Iå
i=1
Z

ij
h
aij(!)
( 1)/ + bjqij(!)( 1)/
i
d!
)/( 1)1A  U j .
The first-order conditions for qij(!) and qkj(!0) are given by
pij(!) = F
0 
(
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
h
aij()
( 1)/ + bjqij()( 1)/
i
d
)1/( 1)
bjqij(!)
 1/
pkj(!
0) = F 0 
(
I
å
k=1
Z

kj
h
akj()
( 1)/ + bjqkj()( 1)/
i
d
)1/( 1)
bjqkj(!
0) 1/,
which implies the standard condition
qij(!)
( 1)/ =

pij(!)
pkj(!0)
1 
qkj(!
0)( 1)/.
Plugging this expression into the utility constraint and using Aj from (2), we have
F
0@"A( 1)/j + bj qkj(!0)( 1)/pkj(!0)1 
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)
1 d!
#/( 1)1A = U j ,
which implies
A
( 1)/
j + bj
qkj(!
0)( 1)/
pkj(!0)1 
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)
1 d! =
h
F 1(U j)
i( 1)/
.
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Solving this equation for qkj(!0) and using Pj from (5), we obtain the compensated
demand function conditional on Aj as follows:
qkj(pjk(!
0),Aj ,Pj ,U j) = pkj(!0) P j
8<:

F 1(U j)
( 1)/  A( 1)/j
bj
9=;
/( 1)
.
Finally, the expenditure function conditional on Aj , e(Aj ,Pj ,U j), can be obtained by
plugging the compensated demand function into the objective function.
Appendix C: Alternative derivation of formula (9).
To obtain formula (9), we may alternatively maximize utility (3) subject to the budget
constraint
I
å
i=1
Z

ij
pij(!)qij(!)d! =
wj
Ej
.
Then, the demand functions are given by
qij(!) = pij(!)
 P  1j
wj
Ej
.
Plugging this expression into (2) and setting wj = 1, we obtain
Qj =
Wj
Ej
,
where Wj = 1/Pj is the welfare measure used in acr and Melitz and Redding (2014a).
Taking the log of both sides of (3) and differentiating, we obtain
d lnUj = "F 
 
Ajd lnAj + Qjd lnQj

,
where "F  (F 0/F )[A( 1)/j + bjQ( 1)/j ]/( 1) is the elasticity of the upper-tier utility,
F . Noting that d lnQj = d lnWj   d lnEj , the above expression can be rewritten as
d lnUj = "F 

Ajd lnAj + Qj (d lnWj   d lnEj)

.
Since we consider the rate of change in the equivalent income in country j, d lnEj , that
holds utility constant at the initial level, we set d lnUj = 0 to obtain the formula (9).
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